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Overview 
 Overview of Environment  
 Potential Improvements 
 Risk Sharing (contract type selection) 
 Second Price Sealed Bid 
 Second Score Sealed Bid 
 USAF T-X Program 
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Introduction 
 Statement of the Problem 
 The DOD holds an inferior position when bargaining with 
the private sector (known budget). This creates 
inefficiencies in procurement leading to excess spending 
for the quality of product supplied.  
 Research Questions 
 What mechanisms should the DOD employ to incentivize 
truth telling and efficiency in performance? 
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Risk Sharing 
 Why discuss principle-agent (government-
contractor) risk sharing? 
 Tendency to inappropriately skew towards risk 
sharing extremes (FFP1 and TM2) 
 FFP1 
 TM2 
 The DOD is missing out on the full breadth of 
tools currently offered. 
 
1USD (AT&L) Kendall, Frank. Use of Fixed-Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) Contracts in Development and 
Production. Defense AT&L, Mar-Apr 2013.  
2USD (AT&L) Kendall, Frank. Appropriate Use of Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable Source 
Selection Process and Associated Contract Type. 4 March 2015. 
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Risk Sharing 
Types of Contracts by Risk3 
3Adapted from Garrett, 2007, World class contracting (4th ed.) 
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Risk Sharing 
 Contract Types: 
 Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
 Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FPEPA) 
 Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) 
 Fixed Price Incentive (Firm Target) 
 Fixed Price Incentive (Successive Targets) 
 Fixed Price with Award Fee (FPAF) 
 Cost Sharing (CS) / Cost (C) 
 Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) 
 Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 
 Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) 
 Cost Plus Percentage of Cost (CPPC) 
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Risk Sharing 
 Contract Types: 
 Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
 Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FPEPA) 
 Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) 
 Fixed Price Incentive (Firm Target) 
 Fixed Price Incentive (Successive Targets) 
 Fixed Price with Award Fee (FPAF) 
 Cost Sharing (CS) / Cost (C) 
 Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) 
 Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 
 Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) 
 Cost Plus Percentage of Cost (CPPC) 





Line   Equivalent or Direct Equivalent to: 
FPIF 0/100 = Direct Equivalent of FFP 
FPIF 100/0 = Equivalent of CPFF 
CPIF 100/0 = Direct Equivalent of CPFF 
CPIF 0/100 = No logical direct equivalent 
I n t e g r i t y  -  S e r v i c e  -  E x c e l l e n c e 9 
Risk Sharing 
 Recommendations: 
 Require reporting of share lines and price ceiling percentages 
 Failing to consider the share line present in a incentive contract risks seriously 
mischaracterizing implicit contract cost risk 
 Future research to characterize the difference in risk tradeoffs 
between FPIF and CPIF 
 
 
Proposed scale of cost risk transferred 
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Second Price Sealed Bid 
Literature: 
Myerson (1981) Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
 
Application: limited to single item, pure price  
discrimination with multiple bidders 
 FFP and FPEPA  
 FAR Part 14 
 FAR Part 15, LPTA (award 
without discussions) 
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Second Price Sealed Bid 
     Recommendations: 
 Utilize Second Price Sealed Bidding for all FAR Part 14 acquisitions 
 Utilize Second Price Sealed Bidding for FAR Part 15 LPTA acquisitions 
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Second Score Sealed Bid 
Literature: 
Che (1993) 
 optimal scoring rule auction under one-dimensional quality  
Asker and Cantillon (2008) 
 Scoring rule dominates menu option and beauty contest in 
procurement auctions 
Bichler (2000)  
 Second-price, multi-attribute auctions yield more efficient results 
than first-price multi-attribute auctions 
Nishimura (2012)  
 Optimal scoring rule exists with multi-dimensional quality 
 Incremental production cost relationship of attributes 
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Second Score Sealed Bid 
    Application: differentiated products/services 
 FAR Part 15 acquisitions  
 Requires a publishable scoring rule  
 First score bidder graded to the price and score of the second bidder 
 
    Recommendations: 
 Extends the efficiencies found in Second Price Sealed Bid to 
differentiated contracts 
 Pilot implementation with a program with well-defined requirements 
 A possible pilot implementation… 
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T-X Advanced Pilot Trainer 
(T-X Industry Day 29-31 Jan 2013)  
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T-X Advanced Pilot Trainer 
 Recommendation: 
 Multi-Attribute Second Score Sealed Bid 
 Give suppliers freedom to specialize in areas of expertise  
 Greater quality incentivized than price only auction   
       (Bichler 2000) 
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T-X Advanced Pilot Trainer 
 Recommendation: 
 Account for Complimentary and Substitutionary Attributes  
 e.g. Speed vs. Maneuverability 
 Incentivize suppliers to provide quality in multiple areas 
 Focus on complete plane rather than specific attributes 
 Stop suppliers from “gaming” the scoring equation 
 
(Nishimura 2012)  
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T-X Case Study 
     Recommendations: 
 Utilize Second Score Sealed “Bidding” 
 FAR Part 15, FFP with the intent to award without discussions 
 Publish model with trade space explicit, to include substitutionary and 








 Reputation Systems 
 Opportunity to rate vendor 
 Signals: Internet and Rating 
 
 Fernandes 
 Trust Management Systems 
 Providing rewards is an effective way to get feedback 
 Ebay, Amazon 
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Reputation Attribute 
Reputation Attribute 
 Non-Monetary Incentive 
 Incentivize “truthful bids” and “sticking to contract” 
 Implemented in Bidding / Scoring Process 
 Provide Continuous Reward or Punishment 
 Cost, Schedule, Performance 
 Reduce Standard Deviations from Original Contract 
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Reputation Attribute 
Assumptions/Criteria 
 Effective If: 
 Disclosed Score Individually (secretly) 
 Multiple Bids 
 Later programs likely to incorporate this in future 
proposal grading 
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Summary 
    The DOD should: 
 Collect share line data to complement continuing research 
into FPIF and CPIF 
 Conduct further research distinguishing FFP, FPIF, CPIF, 
and CPFF 
 Immediately adopt Second Price Sealed Bid for 
undifferentiated goods likely to receive multiple offers and 
award without discussions 
 Pilot the use of Second Score Sealed Bid 
 Investigate the use of a separate Reputation Attribute to 
correct CPARS deficiencies 
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Contact Information 
 Estimated publishing: August 2015 
 Contact Information: 
 Capt Will Griffin, william.griffin.14@us.af.mil 
 
